No freeman shall be bound by any law
to which he has not consented.
                                        The Sons of Liberty

Leave ten people alone in a room and
they'll pick a chairman, select a by-laws
committee, and argue about the name of
their newborn group.
                                        Toqueville

Conclusion

Direct citizenly inclusion and indirect decision-making in public affairs has been a legitimate claim throughout the history of the nation: variously rising and declining in import as merited by local or national issues. Groups or movements based in the claim of popular democracy, successful or not, are never contestable in the rectitude of the idea, though specific ends may be. Town hall democracy, populism, unionization, referendum and recall, American brands of socialism and the more recent civil rights and student movements all have found readily applicable language in the nation's charter.

Toqueville has made us famous to ourselves and others for yet another national feature: the tendency to form voluntary associations. But I suspect the name for this activity hides as much as it reveals. In fact, this nation is and always has been rife with efforts to remake within itself little worlds of new belief and practice (Kantor), perhaps in response to the vaunted individualism and lack of community and commitment that continues to worry the national character (Bellah, et al.) There appears to be a perennial American instinct to build within these worlds in the name of moral, practical, and material interests.

The 1960s and 70s were a paroxysm of new creations: collectives, cooperatives, evangelical and synthetic religious assemblages (Hedgepeth, and Taylor; Needleman; Stein) and, in varying degrees, the groups studied in this book. In its most recent incarnations, this instinct to remake social life has included participation as both means and ends and place as the focus of the remaking. I have tried to capture

episodes of this over twenty years of a significant portion of our recent history, to show what happened, how, and why. I claim that these cases are representative of the rise, routinization, and (momentary) subsidence of the impulse to participatory democracy. They are illustrative of what happened to the enacted idea over that period. They may not represent the trajectory of its path, but they are a version of one yet to be discerned.

The Participatory Explosion

The massively generative 1960s demand interpretation. Engaged, biased, and fitful, the abound (Dickstein; Marias; DeMott; Thompson; Sayres, et al; Tipton; Clecak). But, seen either as the most recent and unusually large wave crashing toward a socialist America (Moberg) or as a vast national experiment with the democratization of selfhood (Clecak), it all appears, in retrospect, to demonstrate that "The people need to see themselves' experimenting in democratic forms" (Goodwin:1). The need is there, I believe, because, in matters democratic, America firmly promises more than it knows how to deny or deliver. The question of what we mean by participatory democracy remains continually open to test.

The democratic goals of the civil rights movement were nested securely in the promises of the Constitution. In the prosecution of those goals--to bring official behavior into consonance with the overarching law--both the civil rights and student movements gradually articulated a bottom-to-top conception of participatory democracy by which "people power" would eat away at the feet of instituted authority and control masked as electoral politics.

At best, the liberal democratic administrations' conception of participation approached that wherein electoral politics smoothes the curve of equities through universal suffrage and free elections. Competition for votes, winning and losing office are expressions of non elite control over elite competitors for office and, presumably, empowers every voter with some degree of influence over elected leaders' behavior. "Participation" is the statement of interests through the vote and the lobbying of constituencies (Pateman:14). This conception was severely tested by the bottom-up movements of black and poor people and by universisty-based students. As their demands grew, liberal university, foundation, and federal government elites responded with reformist vigor. The Ford Foundation's "Gray Areas Project"

and the Kennedy administration's President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Crime both sought

to ameliorate urban poor peoples' problems of education, employment, and youth crime with major

programs designed to empower the poor through direct participation in those programs.\1/ Both were

founded on the assumption that the problems they addressed were symptoms of powerlessness.

Envisioning and designing a social therapy,
        the reformers believed that the people of the slums, too,
        must have a voice in any program of (sic) their behalf.
        The gray area projects were to "plan with people, not for
        people," and the President's Committee insisted upon
        "evidence that individuals and organizations in the target
        community recognize in the project a legitimate force for
        change. Part of such evidence will be their involvement in
        the project's planning process." Thus the programs were
        not only to be dispassionately rational, and endorsed by
        community leaders, but also an authentic expression of
        the wishes of the program's constituents. (Marris &
        Rein: 164)

These programs were to be carefully--and rationally--managed: "The strategy of reform was somehow to

accommodate both the analytic precision of a carefully staged experiment, and <u>the extension to its

furthest</u> <u>limit of democratic participation</u> (Marris & Rein: 166; emphasis added.)

        So, while the organized clamor for democratic inclusion grew from below, a national liberal elite

was modeling and packaging its possibilities from above. In funded programs in the nation's major cities,

including Oakland, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, the tool of reform was the "community organization."

These were to be microcosms of democracy, the exercise of which would focus on the remediation of

local ills. Two major problems immediately beset these programs. First, the sheer magnitude of the

funding immediately brought community participants and instituted authority into competition for control of

funds and management of program focus and impacts. This problem continued to plague both Ford's

and the President's Committee's efforts, despite systematic measures they took in program design to

protect local inclusion in design and management. A second major problem was the meaning and

proposed outcomes of community organizations:
        Community organization could . . . be interpreted with a
        very different emphasis, according to the standpoint of
        the organizer. It could be used to encourage the residents
        of a neighborhood to come to terms with the demands of

a wider society, or conversely to force the institutions of
that society to adapt more sympathetically to the special
needs of a neighborhood. Or it could be seen rather as a
form of therapy, to treat apathy and social disintegration.
And it might take an individual bias--promoting the social
mobility of potential leaders, championing cases of
personal injustice--or a communal bias more concerned
with the neighborhood as a mutually supportive community
(Marris & Rein: 169).

For the national planners, community organizations were to have been "a new source of power to reinforce their pressure for institutional change." (169) In practice they took the shape of biases, conflicts, and struggles at the funded sites, often falling short of significant change.

Nonetheless, by the Spring of 1965, with the passage of the second title of the Economic Opportunity Act by Congress, these novel interventions provided the model for the subsequent Poverty Program. It, in turn, approximated the earlier efforts with its Community Action programs, among others. Initially these focused less on the systematic structuring of local groups' programs than it did on "maximum feasible participation" of the poor in them. New programs were created and extant ones were supported. (Thus, for example, the Rev. Leon Sullivan's OIC opened in March 1964 and quickly became the beneficiary of OEO funding.)

It is at the intersection of the new federal programs and Bootstrap's creation that I want to begin inspection of the trajectory of participation over the period that the case studies in this book cover.

Recall that the civil rights organizations were, at this point, consciously moving away from direct, nonviolent action and attempting to establish ghetto-rooted organizations designed to stabilize, focus, and direct local activism. There was a certain circular and cumulative relationship between this shift and the assorted elements of the Poverty Program: each was institutionalizing in response to the other. Again, mediated by professional elites, the federal programs were a direct response to popular calls for action. On the other hand, despairing of the slothful progress of the federal government, civil rights organizations sought to move more systematically into the arena of institutional change.

At the same time (1964-1965) the student movement added a critical intellectual and activist caste to the meaning of participation more radical than that responsively defined in the Community Action

program.   Progressively rejectionist of federal meanings, the combined--but differently motivated--voices of black and student activists spoke for "community control" and "alternative institutions." Both ideas were radical in their intent: the former seeking empowerment and change through direct control of programs, schools, and other community institutions; the latter resolving the conflict by counseling radical escape into ideal-faithful issue active groups.

Operation Bootstrap represents an effort to negotiate a path through these conflicts while staying as close as possible to the most energizing themes of the times. The amalgam of its ideology, goals, and participants was delicately balanced to achieve goals delivered by a waning civil rights movement and local need, especially as represented by the Watts rebellion: an event that sent the entire movement back to the interpretive drawing board and provided the citywide desire to understand and act from which Bootstrap drew its initial energetic support.

Bootstrap was similar to federal programs and, even (inadmissibly), Sullivan's OIC in Philadelphia. But it was to be a counter-image of these programs, more ambitious and autonomous. Its complex evolution through interpersonal and intergroup exchange can be understood in light of the saliency and motivating force of the ideals its members held. But it is also true that the fights normally attendant to federal funding were replaced in Bootstrap with intense interpersonal struggles over ideals-- racial harmony, black education for survival, participation, self-help economic development--as a means of resource accumulation! That is to say, these struggles were engines of participatory satisfaction and engagement, generators of work energy and commitment, and producers of money and other useful things: the stuff of which the place was made. Operation Bootstrap did not die, as did many Community Action projects, from conflict exhaustion. It died with the decline of participatory satisfactions brought on by its own rationalized achievement and shifts in the national attention.

Bootstrap's growth and decline covered a twelve-year period (1964-1976). Its life covered the entire rich and unique period of alternatives formation, growth, decline, and death (Case and Taylor: Stein). Similarly, the variety of black organizations--nationalist, separatist, development oriented-- followed this path (Blair). Not all died, but all suffered from the economic recession of the early seventies,

the decline of protest passions as the last U.S. troops left Vietnam, and the national preoccupation with new priorities in the postwar period (Carroll).

Seeds of the Synthetic

       I have called Potrero del Sol a case of "synthetic" participation because disparate groups and interests were assembled by a city agency to collaboratively negotiate a place into existence. That case, with its professional mediators, is the end of my hypothesized trajectory. But this synthetic element was a feature of federal programs from the beginning. As Saran notes:

> The Head Start program is an example of a single piece of
> legislation authorizing the creation of hundreds (if not
> thousands) of discrete settings each one of which required
> that people be brought together in new relationships in
> order to achieve over time the objectives of the program.\2/

And, people wrote proposals to justify funding for projects of which the projected participants were often unaware. By the seventies, the federal government had retreated from or practically tamed the confusing "maximum feasible participation" in the evolved Model Cities and other programs. But the expectation of and requirement for a modified citizen participation was retained in the old and built into the new programs. Thus, the Berkeley Unified School District's proposal to the newly created National Institute of Education to reconstitute twenty-four school sites along more open and participatory lines was a response both to local demand and to the NIE's request for proposals. NIE required that Berkeley select the school sites so as to stimulate experimental conditions and introduced a layer of school site, districtwide, and national "evaluators" to monitor the progress of its programs at each level. More important, managerial control was kept close to the district and the federal agencies.

Even though Kilimanjaro began and died during Bootstrap's existence, it is illustrative, in the context of the entire Berkeley Experimental Schools Program, of the top-down synthetic net descending on the "alternatives" movement and participatory endeavors. Leaving aside the question of the members' preoccupations and organizational skills, their radical vision was played out in a glass house. Their activities were visible to, and supported by the District and the NIE staff in the service of an educational

"test." In retrospect, there was never a chance that Kilimanjaro or any other alternative would break through the floor of bureaucratic authority--even one that met them half way--and "change the system," What did take place in the giddy excitement of the times--especially, but not exclusively, in Berkeley--was a controlled and supervised opportunity to set up shop and play house with ideals lent great power by the movements of the sixties. The alternative and the District were serious, but they were serious about different things.

As the force of the earlier activism fell away, Kilimanjaro people seeped back into their ordinary and extraordinary lives. The Fed and the District had given participation its funded day in court. Such was the case throughout the country, and much was learned. The people in general learned to expect the right of some form of participation in decisions that affected their local lives. Governments at all levels learned how to offer it in a palatable way.

The People and "City Hall"

I take the case of Peralta Elementary School to be illustrative of the fate of participation in the early seventies. The demand for participation still retained enough stinging force to elicit official response, but officialdom now increasingly controlled the definition and structuring of the response. Indeed, those demanding inclusion increasingly ceded that control and adopted an organized adversarial stance in relation to it. Federal programs of the sixties may well have set the conditions for this development. Tracing the transformation of Community Action and Model Cities programs, Rohe and Gates conclude:

> Unclear guidelines concerning the nature of citizen parti-
> cipation . . . led to conflict between community groups and
> city hall, which in many instances resulted in the delay of
> program implementation and inflated project costs. Phrases
> such as "maximum feasible participation" were interpreted
> differently from program to program.   Only after consider-
> able conflict arose were more specific program guidelines
> offered, and by that time the battle lines had been drawn.
> Given the desire of program planners to permit as much
> local discretion as possible, however, these conflicts may
> have been unavoidable. In fact, it may be argued that the
> ambiguities associated with the nature of citizen participa-
> tion in these programs were instrumental in the develop-

ment of strong neighborhood organizations. It provided
an issue around which they could rally supporters and learn
how to negotiate with city hall.

`

There is a certain irony here. With the waning of the very protest groups and counter
organizations that raised the issue to an unavoidable level of visibility, and the clear return of participatory
management to the hands of officials, the poor and not-so-poor learned new lessons in organized
advocacy. The Peralta protagonists were not about the moral or political reconstitution of Oakland or
American life. They accepted the District's right to authoritative existence and, as strategic adversaries,
sought to extract concession from it while borrowing heavily from an inherited political nomenclature of
participation. This was a two-party, single issue conflict between an institution that had and an
adversarial group that wanted.

Paul Starr distinguished two types of "counter organization" in the sixties: the exemplary and the
adversarial. The former, for example communes, "seeks to exemplify in its own structure and conduct an
alternative set of ideals--the ideals, its organizers may hope, of a new society." And, "Its aim is the direct
and independent realization of its ultimate values, within the circumference of its own activities." (Starr:
246-247) By contrast, political parties, reform groups, and the like may seek alteration of the prevailing
order but may do so without exemplifying the values inherent in their goals in the conduct or structure of
their adversarial organization. Each type is imperiled, Starr argues, when it tries to be both:

An exemplary institution--or rather its membership--may
sympathize with struggles against the dominant order, but
taking a direct part in conflict would sap its strength and
jeopardize whatever freedom it might have to carry on its
own activities. Consequently, it generally must make some
accommodation with the society and the state. Conversely,
the members of an adversary organization might wish to
incorporate their ultimate values in its structure, but such
a step could impede its effectiveness. For instance, they
might prefer it to be open and decentralized, but the con-
ditions of conflict might now allow that kind of organization.
In a highly centralized society, effective opposition is likely
to be centralized too. (247)

We saw versions of this tension complexly played out in both the Bootstrap and Kilimanjaro cases.
Peralta's advocates had no such conflict: no exemplary ideological paraphernalia, and, therefore, no

concept of "selling out": no resource base to maintain to keep the organization alive. It was a voluntaristic, mobile, hit-and-run group that could strike many postures as fit its goal-oriented needs. Bound by a thin moral thread of democratic inclusion and the rope of experience-based practical need for it, Marcus Foster and the District behaved more cumbersomely, the same.

Professionals and the Agency

In the case of Peralta, an architectural joint venture was interviewed by representatives of the school district and the parent group. The team of professionals--thinking strategically, but in the grip of participatory developments in their profession--was consciously designed to offer a facilitation element in its approach to help elicit from parents, teachers, and students ideas the architects would blend, under vigilant eyes, into a responsive design. At Potrero del Sol, the Recreation and Parks Department, by contrast, constructed the entire set of relationships: The firm it selected was contractually required to design and execute a participatory plan; theirs was the official call to participation that assembled the actors, began the process, and validated the professionals' efforts; the professionals' contractual duty was not only to facilitate the generation and distillation of useful design ideas, but to mediate the relations between these groups and the agency.

In a fundamental respect, this agency-created synthesis required professionals to simulate a single group focused on a single outcome. And, inevitably, this type of professional intervention entails some degree of "engineered consent." With the conflicting interests synthetic groupings create, the process is messy. There are incessant interpersonal, intergroup, and agency surprises; little and big fires to be tended. "Winging it" is basic to such a process. Nonetheless, a substitute for actual consensus must exist. The professional is that substitute, "officially" disinterested in any issue other than the creation of something that, in the end, represents the best summary of everything seen and heard in light of time, budget, and the possible. At Potrero, the place created was that summary.

This is, I believe, where my hypothesized trajectory ends. Having worked its way into our official national doings, it is being played out this way across the country. Compared to the last day of 1959, it is incontestably so that, today, participation has crowded its way into our institutional lives and ordinary expectations. This is the true practical legacy of the sixties. Bureaucracies codify. By 1978, following the tumult of the previous eighteen years, the Federal Regional Council's handbook, <u>Citizen Participation</u>, had clarified citizen participation to involvement in advisory committees, planning boards, and/or access to published summaries to be used in public hearing debates. Participatory regulations for fifteen public agencies (e.g., Commerce, Labor, E.T.A.) and 150 subprograms (e.g., National Student Volunteer Farm Workers Program) were specified.

Dependent on federal money and, thereby, regulations, states and municipalities mirror this codified participation. Closer to the people, they have also paid attention to the pattern of representation on boards and-- omissions (this is certainly true of the four municipalities that housed the cases of this book).

Ordinary people readily exercise their participatory rights, all too often in conservative resistance to physical changes proposed for their neighborhoods. And, neighborhood groups abound. In a systematic study of 51 neighborhood planning efforts across the country, Gates and Rohe discovered that initial support for such programs originated overwhelmingly with planning directors, planning staff, city manager, and mayors. (85) In 75 percent of their cases, physical boundaries established the site of the project and the definition of the neighborhood. Projects were almost exclusively administered by city agencies (78), largely due to federal government requirements. Of course, the Fed was far and away the largest source of funding for these projects. Roles of planning professionals and neighborhood groups were clearly bifurcated:

Roles of Neighborhood Planners

Role	Frequency	Percent*
Technical assistant	50	98.0
Liaison	46	90.2
Educator	33	64.7
Organizer	23	45.1
Mediator	21	41.2
Advocate	21	41.2
Other	2	3.9

*Percent does not add up to 100 since respondents were able to
choose more than one role. (83)

Roles of Neighborhood Groups

Role	Frequency	Percent*
Identify problems	51	100.0
Review plans	46	90.2
Develop plans	41	80.4
Self-help	39	76.5
Monitor projects	34	66.7
Other	2	3.9

*Percent does not add up to 100 since respondents were able to
choose more than one role. (84)

The outcomes appear to have been satisfactory to both:

Program Accomplishments as Identified by Survey Respondents

Accomplishment	Frequency	Percent*

Project initiation and improved physical conditions	28	54.9
Increased community awareness and competence	20	39.2
Increased citizen influence on city officials	13	25.5
Increased citizen participation in planning	12	23.5
Improved communication between neighborhoods and city officials	12	23.5
Improved local services	4	8.2

_____

* Percentages add up to greater than 100 since multiple answers were
 allowed. (103)

Obviously, this is not the only outcome of the participation path. The end is forked, even frayed,

in terms of other specific and more general outcomes. I would like to discuss these in the context of the

overall review of this interesting period and hazard some thoughts about the future.

Protest to Place: From Counterinstitution to Moral Habitat

But what happened to the grand visions? One reads, occasionally, of a commune or collective

still living according to principles of democratic or spiritual openness, having found a way to live through

carpentry. Remnants of the past are visible, like the hugely successful Rolling Stone magazine,

outgrowth of the underground press. (Kopkind: Kreiger) Alternative schools gave language and

suggested form for federally funded "magnet" schools dedicated to the arts or sciences. The alternatives

movement certainly fueled the continuing debate over the structure and process of education.

The civil rights movement changed the balance of representation on city councils, and state

legislatures in the north and south (Frye) and provided the political impetus for the electoral control of

black dominated cities. The Poverty Program greased the social mobility of many minority individuals:

individuals who learned the machinations of power and influence in community organizations. Obviously

neither Bootstrap's nor any other dream for the black ghetto came to fruition. The depressing and

massive growth of the black underclass is documented. (   ) Witness Watts today.

I believe that a major cultural legacy of the sixties and seventies is the heightened tendency-- throughout the country--to form places: bounded and named enclaves were particular expressions of self, social life and the good find a moral locale. I have in mind here women's houses, independent living centers for the disabled, expanded and explicit gay neighborhoods (and banks!), Rajneespurams, Jonestown, evangelical "theme parks" and universities, black urban sects, senior centers, and the like. It seems to me that, during and after the civil rights movement, themes of liberation, empowerment, self-acceptance ("Black Is Beautiful"), the legitimacy of distinctive ways of belief and life, were taken up by many other groups.\2/ Sixties explorations in spiritual and psychological inner journeys formed additional bases for joining in place. (Tipton) Less place-like, but related, were developments like "EST" and other organizations that packaged psychological and spiritual liberation and--for a fee--various forms of salvation and, sometimes, membership.

Many of these formations attach to a loosened meaning of social "movement": the gay liberation movement, the women's movement, the human potential movement, etc. It is not clear to me whether this place formation trend is a result of the lessons taught in the sixties and seventies or if they are part of a larger societal growth of which these are a first expression. It is clear that the trend suggests a growing need to reduce the experience of the largeness of things and to find inclusive identity in a locale with a common people who conceive of themselves in ways unacknowledged in the larger world: to confirm this identity on the land with a people with a name. A place of moral reference. A place to believe in.

Here a difficult issue appears. My argument, it turns out, echoes that of Peter Clecak. Exemplary and adversary groups of the sixties and seventies had imagined, through their work, the seeding of a new world. Critical left retrospectives remember an apolitical fifties, a dynamic, organized, and hopeful sixties, and a pointless, meandering seventies (Clecak: 1-5; Caroll). According to these critiques, that was significant was a structural analysis of American capitalism as a social, political, and cultural system and a structured attack on them from from the ground of daily life up. (Flacks) Anathema was individual or group "adjustment" to the system. Religious, spiritual, and psychological inner voyages seeking to dissolve the knots of alienation, unhappiness, and the experience of oppression left the system intact. I

am in essential agreement with this position but, here, must agree with Clecak on what <u>did</u> happen. A

model of dissent was formed by those earlier activities:
> Beginning with the civil-rights movement, the patterns of
> dissent and public interest grew steadily wider, affecting
> nearly every group in society. The grew deeper, creating
> what M. L. Nieberg termed a cultural storm" in the late
> sixties. By the early seventies, the main force of this storm
> had abated. The idea of a "movement" had paled, and its
> extreme cultural and political ideas and styles had faded
> from sustained political view. In spite of these develop-
> ments--perhaps largely because of them--the Movement
> bequeathed a powerful legacy. Its radical countercultural
> dimensions were diluted and diffused throughout society. (19)

Equally compelling is his sense of this diffusion:

> Dissent not only affected people in every part ot the
> spectrum of American political ideology. It penetrated
> the regions of culture and personality--of individual
> consciousness--to such an extent that large numbers
> of citizens acquired the habit of dissent or at least
> exercised it with increasing frequency. The explosion
> of personal dissent greatly intensified cultural syncre-
> tism--the simultaneous presence of old and new, right
> and left, dominant and subordinate values and cultural
> habits. In turn, this "mingling of strange gods," to
> borrow Daniel Bell's apt phrase, energized, enriched,
> and democratized the quest for personal fulfillment.
> This interplay of apparent opposites further pluralized
> and fragmented the cultural atmosphere in which the
> quest unfolded. Individuals sought identity and ful-
> fillment by picking and choosing from among the
> ideological and cultural detritus of the culture storm.
> Even though traditional practices persisted, often in
> fragmentary forms, traditional modes of authority
> withered. (21)

I am not as sanguine as Clecak appears to be about the merits and political implications of this

development. But something like his interpretation of the sixties and seventies is at the base of the place

making outcome that I detect. He views those decades
> as aspects of a single, uncompleted chapter in American
> civilization. Despite clear differences in mood and attitude,
> as well as substantial changes in the political economy, I
> believe that this episode was unified by a central cultural
> theme: a quest for personal fulfillment, a pursuit of a free,
> gratified, unalienated self within one or more communities
> of valued others. ( )

It is my sense that something is occurring that is larger than "a quest for personal fulfillment." Rather, ordinary people are trying to find an agreeably identifiable self with others in a media-drowned culturescape; and identity where participation is the same as valued life conduct.\3/

Political party affiliation no longer serves this overarching function. The legitimacy of all our institutions receives compromising blows weekly. Ethnic enclaves and other forms of neighborhood can, under the right circumstances, serve as reference points, but the vast majority of Americans are left without a moral home. The condition is intolerable. The sixties and seventies taught us new approaches to a solution.